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Recent evidence suggests that multisensory integration of bodily signals involving exteroceptive and
interoceptive information modulates bodily aspects of self-consciousness such as self-identiﬁcation and
self-location. In the so-called Full Body Illusion subjects watch a virtual body being stroked while they
perceive tactile stimulation on their own body inducing illusory self-identiﬁcation with the virtual body
and a change in self-location towards the virtual body. In a related illusion, it has recently been shown
that similar changes in self-identiﬁcation and self-location can be observed when an interoceptive signal
is used in association with visual stimulation of the virtual body (i.e., participants observe a virtual body
illuminated in synchrony with their heartbeat). Although brain imaging and neuropsychological evi-
dence suggest that the insular cortex is a core region for interoceptive processing (such as cardiac per-
ception and awareness) as well as for self-consciousness, it is currently not known whether the insula
mediates cardio-visual modulation of self-consciousness. Here we tested the involvement of insular
cortex in heartbeat awareness and cardio-visual manipulation of bodily self-consciousness in a patient
before and after resection of a selective right neoplastic insular lesion. Cardio-visual stimulation induced
an abnormally enhanced state of bodily self-consciousness; in addition, cardio-visual manipulation was
associated with an experienced loss of the spatial unity of the self (illusory bi-location and duplication of
his body), not observed in healthy subjects. Heartbeat awareness was found to decrease after insular
resection. Based on these data we propose that the insula mediates interoceptive awareness as well as
cardio-visual effects on bodily self-consciousness and that insular processing of interoceptive signals is
an important mechanism for the experienced unity of the self.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The study of the bodily features of self-consciousness is an in-
triguing topic in recent neuroscience. Normally, people experience a
unitary sense of self that is felt to be localized within the bound-
aries of the physical body (bodily self-consciousness, BSC; Blanke,
2012; de Vignemont, 2011). Multiple sources of exteroceptive in-
formation (tactile, vestibular, visual signals) contribute to BSC. In-
deed, if one or more of these signals are manipulated different
components of BSC can be altered experimentally, such as the
feeling that this body belongs to me (self-identiﬁcation or body10
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.ownership) and the feeling of where my body is located in space
(self-location) (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). One example of such
an experimental paradigm is the so-called Full Body Illusion (FBI).
During this illusion people view a virtual body being stroked while
they simultaneously feel touch on their own body: after several
minutes of stimulation this procedure induces the feeling that the
virtual body belongs to them (self-identiﬁcation) and is associated
with a recalibration of where subjects perceive to be localized in
space, characterized by a drift in self-location towards the virtual
body (Aspell et al., 2009; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007;
Palluel et al., 2011; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). If the visual and
tactile stimuli are administered out of synchrony, no changes in BSC
occur. Thus, during the FBI two temporally synchronous ex-
teroceptive (vision and touch) stimuli are in spatial conﬂict: each
stimulation refers to a body, and the bodies (the real and the virtual
bodies) occupy two different spatial locations.
Table 1
Neuropsychological evaluation of the patient to assess the presence of left spatial
and personal neglect.
Test Cut off (range) Patient's score
Before surgery After surgery
Unilateral spatial neglect
Target cancellation
Star a,b 1(0/56) 0 0
Letterc,d 2(0/104) 0 1
Line bisectionb þ0.74#(2.3/
þ5.67)
1.67 þ0.5
R. Ronchi et al. / Neuropsychologia 70 (2015) 11–2012Exteroceptive information is not the only source contributing
to BSC. It has been theorized that internal states and visceral sig-
nals are at least of equal importance for the bodily self (Craig,
2002; Damasio, 2000). Moreover, recent behavioural experiments
(Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013) demonstrated that ex-
teroceptive and interoceptive signals jointly affect BSC. Thus, As-
pell et al. (2013) showed that the FBI can also be induced by using
a cardio-visual (CV) conﬂict instead of the visuo-tactile (VT) con-
ﬂict as described above. Using a novel FBI-CV paradigm, during
which participants view a virtual body that is surrounded by a
glow ﬂashing in synchrony with the subjects’ heartbeat, it was
reported that both self-identiﬁcation for and drifts in self-location
towards the virtual body are induced similarly to changes as ob-
served by VT stimulation (Aspell et al., 2013). A similar procedure
was shown to induce self-attribution of a virtual hand after CV
synchronous stimulation in a CV version of the rubber hand illu-
sion (Suzuki et al., 2013). The effects induced by this novel CV
manipulation suggest that interoceptive (cardiac) and ex-
teroceptive (visual) signals are integrated and that both signals
and their integration are relevant for BSC.
However, the brain mechanisms of CV integration in general
and during the FBI-CV in particular are currently unknown. One
key candidate region that has been repeatedly associated with the
processing of interoceptive cardiac signals using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) is the insular cortex (Critchley
et al., 2004; Wiebking et al., 2014). Moreover, awareness of in-
teroceptive signals, as measured by a heartbeat awareness task,
has been related to activity of the right insula (Critchley et al.,
2004; Zaki et al., 2012). Other evidence has linked the insula to
bodily self-processing by associating insular activity with illusory
self-attribution of a fake hand (Tsakiris et al., 2007). Neu-
ropsychological studies also support the link between insula and
BSC. Patients with right brain damage may show impaired self-
attribution of their own body parts (somatoparaphrenia: see Vallar
and Ronchi, 2009 for a review). The neural correlates of somato-
paraphrenia include an extensive network of fronto-temporo-
parietal areas, with the involvement of subcortical structures;
some cases have been reported with lesion affecting deep cortical
regions such as the insula (Cereda et al., 2002; Karnath and Baier,
2010; Levine et al., 1991). Moreover, patients with heautoscopy,
illusory own body perceptions characterized by the feeling of
seeing one’s own body in extrapersonal space and strong self-
identiﬁcation with this illusory body, suffer from lesions centred in
the insular region (Heydrich and Blanke, 2013).
In the present study we investigated the involvement of insular
cortex in heartbeat awareness and the effects of cardio-visual
stimulation on BSC in a patient before and after resection of a
selective right neoplastic insular lesion.Personal neglect
Reaching of body parts
Hande 0(0/3) 0 0
Scores: cancellation tasks (differences of omissions between the left and the right
side of the paper); line bisection (deviation in millimetres: positive score¼right-
ward deviation; negative score¼ leftward deviation); hand reaching (errors).
# Mean bisection deviation of controls.
a Wilson, B., Cockburn, J., Halligan, P.W., 1987. Behavioural Inattention Test.
Thames Valley Test Company, London.
b Ronchi, R., Posteraro, L., Fortis, F., Bricolo, E., Vallar, G., 2009. Perseveration in
left spatial neglect: drawing and cancellation tasks. Cortex 45(3), 300–331
c Diller, L., & Weinberg, J., 1977. Hemi-Inattention in rehabilitation. The evolu-
tion of a rational remediation program. In: Weinstein, E. A., Friedland, R.P. (Eds.),
Hemi-inattention and Hemisphere Specialization. Raven Press, New York, pp. 62–
82.
d Vallar, G., Rusconi, M.L., Fontana, S., Musicco, M., 1994. Tre test di esplorazione
visuo-spaziale: Taratura su 212 soggetti normali. Arch. Psicol. Neurol. Psichiatr. 55
(4), 827– 841.
e Bisiach, E., Perani, D., Vallar, G., Berti, A., 1986. Unilateral neglect: personal and
extrapersonal. Neuropsychologia 24(6), 759–767.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
The patient was a 43-year-old male, working as pastry chef. He
was admitted to University Geneva Hospital for an epileptic gen-
eralized seizure. The computerized tomography (CT) and the
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans showed the presence of a
right neoplastic lesion, affecting the entire right insula. The lesion
invaded both anterior and posterior lobules of the right insula
with the exception of the caudal portion of the anterior long in-
sular gyrus. It was in general circumscribed by the anterior, su-
perior and inferior peri-insular sulci. However, antero-inferiorly it
extended beyond the insula’s transverse gyrus to the postero-
medial orbital lobule of the frontal lobe; inferiorly, it spread into
the planum polare of the temporal lobe; medially, it involved thecapsula extrema, the claustrum, the capsula externa and abutted
the putamen along its whole lateral length, as far cranially as the
superior-lateral aspect of the head of the caudate nucleus. Inter-
views with the patient revealed that the ﬁrst symptoms consisted
of short euphoric states that started several months before the
current hospitalization. During these states he smiled and laughed
without any apparent reason or associated mirth. No other ab-
normal sensations or behaviours were noted. At the time of hos-
pitalization in the Department of Neurosurgery at Geneva Hospital
the patient was alert and cooperative. The neurological exam
showed preserved motor, somatosensory and visual functions,
which remained unimpaired also after the tumour removal. No
visual or tactile extinction to double stimulation was detected. A
short neuropsychological evaluation was administered to the pa-
tient. He was perfectly oriented in time (day, month, year, season,
date) and in space (country, canton, city, place, ﬂoor), and com-
pletely aware about his medical/neurosurgical condition (as as-
sessed during a clinical interview). With respect to the spatial
functions, we administered to the patient two cancellation tasks
and one bisection task, as classically done in standard clinical
evaluation of unilateral left spatial neglect. Both before and after
the surgery the patient demonstrated a good performance and
within the cut off scores of the control sample: no target omission
in the star cancellation test, only one omission on the left side in
the letter cancellation test after surgery, and a deviation score of
1.67 mm before and þ0.5 mm after the surgery. No left personal
neglect was detected, asking the patient to reach a body part on
the left side using the unimpaired right hand (score: 0/3). Finally,
during a semi-structured interview the patient demonstrated a
perfect and immediate attribution of the left and right body-parts
both before and after the operation, therefore no signs of soma-
toparaphrenia (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). Table 1 shows the results
of the neuropsychological assessment of left spatial and personal
neglect. Fig. 1 shows the magnetic resonance images of the pa-
tient’s brain damage before (Fig. 1A) and after (Fig. 1B) the
Fig. 1. Magnetic resonance images of the patient’s brain lesion before (A) and after (B) the surgery for the tumour removal. The right-hemispheric brain damage affected the
entire insula (anterior-middle and posterior areas). R: right; L: left.
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thology: the post-operative control MRI revealed a near-to-com-
plete resection with a small tumour residuum lateral to a foremost
tip of the frontal horn of the right lateral ventricle.
A group of 16 age-matched neurologically unimpaired partici-
pants (6 males; mean age: 42.4, SD: 73.9, range: 35–50) were
also tested as control (C) group. All participants had normal or
corrected to normal vision and were naïve to the purpose of the
study and the experimental manipulation induced. All participants
gave their written informed consent for the study’s participation.
2.2. Experimental setup
Patient and controls underwent the FBI paradigm under CV
stimulation and consisted of the virtual reality setup that has been
described previously (Aspell et al., 2013). The virtual reality setup
was composed of two cameras placed on a tripod that were po-
sitioned two metres behind the participant. The cameras ﬁlmed
the back of the participant and the recorded video of his body was
projected in real time onto the head mounted display (HMD
VR1280 Virtual Research Systems, Inc.; Dual SXGA 12801024
resolution, 60° diagonal ﬁeld of view). The HMD was covered by
black tissue occluding surrounding visual input. Moreover, during
the whole experimental session the participant listened to white
noise presented through headphones, to exclude surrounding
auditory input. An in-house software (ExpyVR, http://lnco.epﬂ.ch/
expyvr) was used for visual stimulus presentation and real-time
synchronization.
During the FBI, the participant saw his body on the HMD and
the body was illuminated periodically by a glow surrounding the
body and ﬂashing on and off with the heartbeat. The subject′s
electrocardiogram (ECG) was recorded for the entire session. Raw
data were acquired by an Arduino™ microcontroller with a
mounted e-Health Sensor Shield V2.0 from Libelium™ through
three electrodes placed on the chest. In-house software detected,
in real time, the R peak of the QRS complex (amplitude change
over 80% of the difference between the exponential moving
averages of the maxima and minima of the raw signal). The
ﬂashing glow lasted for 500 ms (sinusoidal transparency from 0%
to 100% visible).
In the synchronous condition, the visual glow ﬂashed syn-
chronously with the QRS complex (with a maximum delay of16 ms after detection of the R peak). During asynchronous cardio-
visual stimulation, the virtual body was illuminated at a frequency
equal to 80% or 120% of the actual heart rate (as in Aspell et al.,
2013). This was obtained by replaying at controlled speed a pre-
recorded ECG (30 s template from a healthy subject): an artiﬁcial
heartbeat ﬂashing was therefore simulated in real-time to emulate
a heartbeat at either 80% (slower) or 120% (faster) of the con-
tinuously measured heart rate of the participant. For the patient,
the 80% asynchronous condition was used.
An heartbeat awareness task (Schandry, 1981) was adminis-
tered to check for the level of interoceptive awareness of partici-
pants (see below for more details).
2.3. Procedure
The FBI-CV included two conditions: CV synchronous (S) and
CV asynchronous (AS) stimulation. The sequence of tests in each
condition was organized as follows: ﬁrst we tested a baseline self-
location (see below), followed by the cardio-visual FBI exposure
(2 min), then the experimental self-location followed by the ad-
ministration of the questionnaire. Patient and control subjects
repeated the whole procedure twice. After synchronous and
asynchronous cardio-visual stimulation, we administered a
heartbeat awareness task. The patient was tested three weeks
before and three months after the resective surgery (A–B experi-
mental assessments); control participants also performed the
procedure twice (Day1–Day2), with about two weeks of time-
interval.
2.4. Behavioural measures
Before and after each FBI-CV session, a task traditionally used
to assess self-location was administered: participants were moved
backwards for 1.5 m and then they have to walk back to the initial
position (see details in Aspell et al., 2013; Lenggenhager et al.,
2007). This position (i.e., the position from where they started
walking backwards) was the same position in which they were
placed during the induction of the FBI. The distance between the
position estimated by the patient and his real original position was
measured in centimetres. Three trials were administered for each
repetition of the task (pre- and post-FBI). The accuracy in the self-
location task was computed by the average of the three trials of
Table 2
The nine items of the Full Body Illusion questionnaire and the patient’s scores after cardio-visual synchronous (S) and asynchronous (AS) stimulations. The scores before and
after the surgery are shown.
Item Patient’s score Patient’s score
Before surgery After surgery
S AS S AS
During the experiment there were times when:
Q1: It seemed as if I was feeling my heartbeat where I was seeing the semi-transparent template ﬂashing 3 3 2 3
Q2: I felt as if my heart was in the virtual body 3 3 3 3
Q3: I felt as if the virtual body was my body þ3 þ3 þ3 3
Q4: It felt as if my body was drifting towards the virtual body 3 3 3 3
Q5: It seemed as if I might have more than one body þ3 3 3 3
Q6: It seemed as if I was having two hearts 3 3 0 3
Q7: It appeared (visually) as if the virtual body was drifting backwards (towards my body) 3 3 3 3
Q8: It seemed as though I was in two places at the same time þ3 3 þ3 3
Q9: It seemed as if the ﬂashing semi-transparent template was my heartbeat 3 3 3 3
R. Ronchi et al. / Neuropsychologia 70 (2015) 11–2014each task repetition, measured in centimetres with respect to the
objective starting position (corresponding to 0): negative numbers
indicated underestimated positions (i.e., the real body was located
more distant from the virtual body) while positive numbers in-
dicated overestimated positions (i.e., the real body was located
closer to the virtual body). The difference between the mean post-
and pre-measures was computed to obtain a measure of self-lo-
cation drift for each condition.
After the self-location task, the questionnaire as used by Aspell
et al. (2013) was administered to investigate self-identiﬁcation
with the virtual body and other subjective sensations (see Table 2).
The patient and control subjects were asked to indicate agreement
or disagreement for nine questions (Q) using a 7-point coloured
vertical Likert scale, ranging from a complete disagreement (the
bottom extreme, red point, scored by the examiner as 3) to a
complete agreement (the top extreme, green point, scored by the
examiner as þ3).
After the questionnaire, the heartbeat detection task as origin-
ally proposed by Schandry (1981) was administered as a measure
of interoceptive heartbeat awareness. Patient and control partici-
pants were asked to report the number of heartbeats they de-
tected during four ﬁxed time intervals (25 s, 35 s, 45 s, 100 s, given
in randomized order), and we compared their score with the real
number of heartbeats (recorded by the ECG) using the following
formula: 1/4∑ [1(|recorded heartbeats-counted heartbeats|)/re-
corded heartbeats]. Based on this, the interoceptive sensitivity
score ranged from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating small dif-
ferences between recorded and counted heartbeats (i.e. high in-
teroceptive sensitivity) and lower scores indicating big differences
between recorded and counted heartbeats (i.e. low interoceptive
sensitivity).
2.5. Statistical analyses
With respect to the performance of the healthy age-matched
participants, parametric analyses (t-test) for scores in the self-lo-
cation task and the heartbeat awareness task were used; non-
parametric analyses (Wilcoxon signed ranks test; Siegel and Cas-
tellan, 1988) were applied to the questionnaire ratings (which
were not normally distributed). Spearman non-parametric corre-
lation coefﬁcients were computed between variables of interest. To
compare the scores of the insular patient with the corresponding
mean data from the control group, we have used the single case
Crawford tests, implemented in the software SINGSLIMS.exe (see
Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002: http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/j.
crawford/pages/dept/psychom.htm#conﬂims. See a similar use of
the Crawford test in Bolognini et al., 2014). The software testswhether an individual’s score is signiﬁcantly different from a
control/normative sample and provides a point estimate of the
rarity/abnormality of the score; namely, it estimates the percen-
tage of the population that would obtain a lower score. Moreover,
the method provides 95% conﬁdence limits on this percentage.
This approach is commonly used in neuropsychological single case
studies, as it allows comparing a given individual′s score with a
control sample with modest size. This method applies a modiﬁed
t-test in which the individual (i.e., the patient in our case) is
treated as a sample of mean¼1 and, therefore, does not contribute
to the estimate of the within group variance. Additionally, with
respect to the results of the questionnaire, we have performed the
single case Crawford tests using ipsatized scores, which are stan-
dard scores calculated with individual subject’s mean and stan-
dard deviation. Statistical analyses using ipsatized scores allow
both a comparison free of response biases and a proper use of
parametric tests as the data are normalized (Broughton and Wasel,
1990; Cattell, 1944; see a previous use of ipsatized scores on
questionnaire ratings in Romano et al., 2014). The signiﬁcance
(alpha) level used was 0.05.3. Results
3.1. Questionnaire
Table 2 reports the list of questions and the patient’s scores of
the questionnaire items before and after the surgery. Before the
operation, the FBI-CV induced maximal self-identiﬁcation with the
virtual body in the S and in the AS conditions (Q3-S and -AS: þ3).
Similar high ratings were given for the feeling of having more than
one body (illusory reduplication; Q5-S: þ3) and the sensation to
be in two places at the same time (illusory bi-location; Q8-S: þ3):
however, these sensations of illusory reduplication and illusory bi-
location were induced only in the CV-S condition, not in the CV-AS
condition. All other questions in S (Q1, Q2, Q4, Q6, Q7, Q9) and AS
(all questions except for Q3) stimulations were rated in total dis-
agreement (all scores: 3). We note that after the S stimulation
condition, the patient spontaneously reported a strange sensation
and expressed to have felt as if he “had a twin” and as if the virtual
body had been his “twin”.
In the control group, no questionnaire item showed a sig-
niﬁcant difference between S and AS conditions on the ﬁrst
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test; all ps40.14) or the second (all
ps40.34, only for Q5 p40.07, with the mean score in AS slightly
higher than S, but both strongly negative) day. Moreover, no
difference between the scores of day1 and day2 was found
Fig. 2. Patient’s agreement scores of some relevant questionnaire’s items before
(A) and after (B) the surgery. The scores ranged from the maximum disagreement
(3) to the maximum agreement (þ3). The black continuous and dotted lines
indicated the conﬁdence interval of the control group at the 95% conﬁdence level
for synchronous and asynchronous conditions, respectively. The list of the ques-
tions and the values relative to each question’s answer by the patient are reported
in Table 2.
Fig. 3. Mean scores of the patient in the self-location task administered before
(A) and after (B) the surgery. The drift indicates, in centimetres (SEM), the mean
difference post-pre FBI. The black continuous and dotted lines indicated the con-
ﬁdence interval of the control group at the 95% conﬁdence level for synchronous
and asynchronous conditions, respectively.
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two experimental sessions in controls, and we compared the mean
values with the patient’s questionnaire scores (difference S–AS)
pre-surgery (Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002). We found a sig-
niﬁcant difference for illusory reduplication (Q5; t¼6.093, one-
tailed po0.001) and illusory bi-location (Q8; t¼4.447, one-tailed
po0.001), but not for self-identiﬁcation (Q3, t¼0.274, one-tailed
p¼0.394). However, for Q3 there was a tendency towards sig-
niﬁcance (patient vs. controls) in the S (t¼1.549, one-tailed
p¼0.071) but not in AS (t¼1.305; one-tailed p¼0.106) condition,
and the self-identiﬁcation ratings (average for S and AS of Q3)
tended to be greater in the patient than in controls (t¼1.511, one-
tailed p¼0.076). No signiﬁcant difference between patient and
controls was found for any of the other questions (all ps40.38).
The same statistical signiﬁcant results comparing patient’s and
controls data were also found using ipsatized scores (Q5; t¼5.555,
one-tailed po0.001. Q8; t¼2.631, one-tailed p¼0.001; all other
ps40.13).
After the surgery, self-identiﬁcation with the virtual body was
only found during the S stimulation (Q3-S: þ3; Q3-AS: -3). In the
CV-S condition the patient still reported strong illusory bi-location
(Q8: þ3; same effect evoked in the pre-surgery CV-S), but no il-
lusory body reduplication (Q5-S and -AS: 3). He now reported an
intermediate agreement with the sensation of having two hearts
(Q6: 0). All other questions for CV-S and CV-AS obtained negative
scores (Q1-S: 2; all other scores: 3). The comparison with
respect to the control group (difference SAS) revealed a sig-
niﬁcant difference for self-identiﬁcation (Q3; t¼4.030, one-tailed
p¼0.001), for bi-location (Q8; t¼4.447, one-tailed po0.001), and
for duplication of the heart (Q6; t¼2.463, one-tailed p¼0.013). No
signiﬁcant difference for any of the other questions was found (all
ps40.35). The same statistical signiﬁcant results comparing pa-
tient’s and controls data were also found using ipsatized scores
(Q3; t¼4.736, one-tailed po0.001. Q6; t¼2.707, p¼0.008. Q8;
t¼3.411, one-tailed p¼0.002; all other ps40.34).
Fig. 2 shows the patient′s scores for the most relevant items of
the questionnaire administered before (A) and after (B) the sur-
gery, with the range (horizontal bars) corresponding to the con-
ﬁdence interval (95%) of the control group.
3.2. Self-location
The patient showed a larger drift in self-location towards the
virtual body in the S vs. AS condition both before and after
the operation. Thus, before the surgery, the FBI-CV induced in the
patient a mean positive drift (i.e., difference between post- and
pre-FBI) in the S condition (þ28.2 cm) and a negative drift in the
AS condition (13.8 cm; difference SAS: 42.0 cm). After the
surgery, the same pattern was found (drift CV-S: þ12.3 cm; drift
CV-AS: 22.2 cm; difference SAS: 34.5 cm).
In the control group, the mean drift scores on day1 in the CV-S
(þ2.25 cm, SD: 16.1) and CV-AS (þ1.80 cm; SD: 17; difference
SAS: þ0.45 cm) conditions were both positive without a sig-
niﬁcant difference between S and AS stimulations (paired t-test;
t¼0.08, p¼0.933); a similar statistical result was found on day2
(CV-S: 2.89 cm, SD: 10.2; CV-AS: 1.31 cm, SD: 9.7; difference
SAS: 1.58 cm) (t¼0.454, p¼0.656). No difference between
the scores of day1 and day2 was detected (p¼0.19) and we com-
pared the mean values of day1 and day2 of the control group with
the patient’s self-location scores. This analysis revealed a sig-
niﬁcant difference between patient and controls in self-location
(difference SAS) before (t¼2.884, one-tailed p¼0.006) and after
(t¼2.379, one-tailed p¼0.016) the operation. Fig. 3 shows the
patient's mean values of the drift in self-location before (A) and
after (B) surgery, with the range (horizontal bars) corresponding to
the conﬁdence interval (95%) of the control group.We note that with respect to previous research about alteration
of BSC as induced by cardio-visual stimulation, [both when the
body (Aspell et al., 2013) or only the hand (Suzuki et al., 2013)
are involved], the present control group did not show the
expected synchrony-dependent effect of self-identiﬁcation with
R. Ronchi et al. / Neuropsychologia 70 (2015) 11–2016and self-location towards the virtual body. Several factors may
account for this difference. First, our sample is age-matched with
the patient, and thus much older than previously tested popula-
tions of healthy subjects. We note that increase in age has been
shown to affect multisensory integration and peri- and extra-
personal space representation (Bloesch et al., 2013; Caçola et al.,
2013; Ghafouri and Lestienne, 2000; Lepelley et al., 2010; Maho-
ney et al., 2011). Even if these cited studies included participants
older than the present age-matched participants, the ﬁndings are
in line with the idea that increased age affects the integration of
multisensory information. Accordingly, the present control group
could show reduced multisensory perception and thus reduced
interoceptive–exteroceptive effects as tested in the present study.
Moreover, the results of previous studies seem to suggest that the
effect size of BSC alteration is smaller for cardio-visual than visuo-
tactile stimulation (Aspell et al., 2013; see Suzuki et al., 2013 for a
direct comparison of the two modalities). Finally, differences could
also be related to the detection of the cardio-visual feedback
during the FBI stimulation (see correlation analyses in Suzuki
et al., 2013). The combination of these factors (demographic
variable, cardio-visual effect size, heartbeat awareness) may have
reduced the interoceptive–exteroceptive effects in our control
group.
3.3. Heartbeat detection
The patient’s heartbeat awareness score decreased from 0.82
(SD: 0.11) before the operation to 0.61 (SD: 0.16) after the opera-
tion. This change was absent in the control subjects and no dif-
ference was found between day1 (M¼0.69; median¼0.63; SD:
0.21) and day2 (M¼0.74; median¼0.77; SD: 0.10) (t¼0.783,
p¼0.446). For one control participant (C2) we failed to record the
score on day1 due to a technical problem.
A ﬁrst comparison between the patient’s heartbeat awareness
with the control group (average of day1 and day2) revealed no
signiﬁcant difference (pre-surgery: t¼0.586, one-tailed p¼0.283;
post-surgery: t¼0.657, one-tailed p¼0.261). However, when we
split the control participants in one subgroup with high (N¼8,
M¼0.85) and another with low (N¼8, M¼0.59) heartbeat
awareness (based on the median heartbeat awareness score of the
control group; median¼0.72) differences were found. Thus, we
found that before the operation the patient’s interoceptive
awareness was comparable with the high-awareness control group
(t¼0.377, one-tailed p¼0.359), but after the surgery sig-
niﬁcantly lower than this group (t¼2.852, one-tailed p¼0.012).
The opposite trend was found when comparing the patient’s
heartbeat awareness with the low awareness group (pre-surgery:
t¼1.963, one-tailed p¼0.045; post-surgery: t¼0.163, one-tailed
p¼0.438). These ﬁndings are compatible with a decrease in
heartbeat awareness due to the operation. The heart rate of the
patient, recorded during the heartbeat awareness task, was
65.8 bpm before and 64.8 bpm after the surgery, respectively. The
difference between the scores of heartbeat awareness cannot be
explained by differences in heart rate between pre- and post-
surgery, as they were almost identical (variance¼1.66 across the
four trials and two conditions).
Finally, in the control group we tested for correlation between
the level of heartbeat awareness and both the measures of self-
location (drift) and self-identiﬁcation (Q3: “I felt as if the virtual
body was my body”). For heartbeat awareness we selected two
different measures: (1) the score of the heartbeat detection task
and (2) the rating of the questionnaire item about the recognition
of the heartbeat in the ﬂashing template during the FBI (Q9: “It
seemed as if the ﬂashing semi-transparent template was my
heartbeat”). As there was no difference between day1 and day2,
we used the average scores of both sessions and we performed aseries of Spearman non-parametric correlation analyses on the
mean scores. We found a trend towards a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between self-identiﬁcation (Q3, difference SAS) and
the score on item Q9 (difference SAS) (r¼0.441, p¼0.087). No
correlation was found between self-location (difference SAS)
and Q9 (difference SAS) (r¼0.001, p¼0.996). Analyses between
the measure of the heartbeat detection task with self-location
(drift; r¼0.016, p¼0.953) or with self-identiﬁcation (item Q3;
r¼0.365, p¼0.165) showed no signiﬁcant correlations.4. Discussion
In the present study we used cardio-visual stimulation and
describe the association of a decrease in heartbeat awareness with
a pathologically enhanced modulation of BSC in a patient suffering
from a lesion affecting the right insula. During the cardio-visual
FBI paradigm the patient showed not only stronger self-identiﬁ-
cation with the virtual body, but also experienced an illusory du-
plication of his body and bi-location (he felt “as though I was in
two places at the same time”). Both latter sensations were absent
in the control subjects and are rare and highly unusual experi-
ences that are normally not encountered in FBI paradigms. These
ﬁndings were further corroborated by the patient’s spontaneous
report of having felt, during synchronous cardio-visual stimula-
tion, as if he had a twin (i.e., the virtual body). Even if it has been
demonstrated that it is possible to experimentally induce the
feeling of having multiple bodies (Heydrich et al., 2013), this
phenomenon has been recorded only when participants actually
did see two bodies in front of them, that were visually “stroked”,
and only when visuo-tactile stimulation was applied synchro-
nously. There were no differences for other sensations between
the subjective questionnaire ratings of the patient vs. controls (i.e.,
items related to the recognition of the heartbeat in the ﬂashing
template/the feeling of heart displacement (Q1, Q2 and Q9) or the
subjective alteration of self-location towards the virtual body (Q4
and Q7)). These items are considered control questions, at least in
neurologically unimpaired subjects (Aspell et al., 2013), revealing
the selective effect in the present insular patient. In addition to
these subjective responses to the questionnaire’s items, the patient
also showed an objective synchrony-dependent drift in self-loca-
tion task towards the location of the virtual body.
What brain mechanisms may mediate these cardio-visual ef-
fects on BSC? Most earlier studies investigated the brain me-
chanisms of exteroceptive (e.g., visual, tactile, auditory) signals for
BSC (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ionta
et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2011; Petkova et al., 2011; Tsakiris
et al., 2007). The present patient data suggest that the processing
of visual information with interoceptive signals, the present car-
dio-visual effects on BSC, is mediated by the insula. The insular
cortex is part of a brain network involved in the processing of
interoceptive and visceral information. Neuroimaging studies
show that interoceptive signals are processed by the insula,
anterior cingulate cortex, and somatosensory regions (Critchley
et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007; Wiebking et al., 2014; Zaki et al.,
2012). Concerning the insula and BSC, we note that right insular
activity has been associated with illusory ownership of a fake hand
(Tsakiris et al., 2007) and that bilateral insula has been proposed to
be a crucial structure for self-consciousness (Craig, 2002; Ionta
et al., 2014). Neuropsychological studies also support the link be-
tween insula and BSC: patients with somatoparaphrenia, a delu-
sional sense of disownership of contralesional body parts, may
show right-brain damage involving the insula (Cereda et al., 2002;
Karnath and Baier, 2010; Levine et al., 1991; Vallar and Ronchi,
2009 for a review). Other data indicate that caloric vestibular sti-
mulation, a technique activating a network of brain regions
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lead to a temporary remission of somatoparaphrenia (Bisiach et al.,
1991; Rode et al., 1992). These studies and the present data con-
verge on important contributions of the insula, in particular of the
right insula, to BSC.
It is known that the insular cortex is related not only to inter-
oceptive processing, but also to interoceptive awareness. In parti-
cular, right insular activity (mainly in the anterior insula) has been
found to correlate with the level of interoceptive awareness of
participants (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007). In line
with these data, after resection of the right insular cortex, the
present patient showed reduced, but not completely compro-
mised, heartbeat awareness as detected with the Schandry
heartbeat detection task. The persistence of interoceptive–ex-
teroceptive (cardio-visual) integration, even if altered, could be
explained by different brain mechanisms that are responsible for
cardiac processing and awareness. It is well known that the right
insula has a major role in interoceptive awareness, but the left
insular cortex is also involved in interoceptive processing as
shown by bilateral insular activations in several neuroimaging
studies (Critchley et al., 2004; Wiebking et al., 2014; Zaki et al.,
2012) and by the bilateral thalamo-insular projections of the in-
teroceptive pathways (Craig, 2002). Additionally, it has been
shown that insular and somatosensory regions constitute two
different systems involved in cardiac awareness. Thus, the pro-
cessing of interoceptive information is possible even after the bi-
lateral lesion of insula (Khalsa et al., 2009); and in some conditions
(e.g., in patients with external cardiac assist devices) somatosen-
sory inputs can even dominate visceral ones for interoceptive
awareness (Couto et al., 2014). These data support the ﬁnding of
persisting (even if altered) processing of interoceptive information
after right insular damage that is sufﬁcient for the reported cardio-
visual effects on BSC. Moreover, we note that the cardiac in-
formation conveyed in the present cardio-visual illusion paradigm
is different from the one the patient was asked to pay attention to
during the Schandry heartbeat detection task. In the ﬁrst case, the
cardiac information is externally shown as a visual stimulus with
the same frequency of the heart. In the Schandry task, the request
is to perceive the cardiac interoceptive signal, without the help of
any external cue. Cardio-visual perception and cardiac perception
do not refer to the same brain processes. One of these proposed
mechanisms, or a combination of them, may have caused the
enhanced illusory effect by cardio-visual signals in the insular
patient, even after the resection of the tumour.
With respect to the performance of the healthy participants,
previous behavioural studies suggest a link between interoceptive
awareness and alteration of BSC, even if the direction of this re-
lationship is still unclear. Concerning visuo-tactile own body illu-
sions, previous work provided evidence in favour of a positive
correlation (Suzuki et al., 2013), while others found evidence in
favour of a negative correlation (Tajadura-Jiménez and Tsakiris,
2014; Tsakiris et al., 2011) between the level of interoceptive
awareness and the level of experimentally induced changes in BSC.
Complementarily, in an experimental manipulation of hand
ownership by cardio-visual stimulation, Suzuki et al. (2013) re-
ported a positive correlation between the level of awareness of
cardio-visual synchrony and the level of illusory changes in BSC: in
that study the measure of interoceptive awareness, which corre-
lated with the cardio-visual effect, was the questionnaire’s item
investigating the explicit recognition of the synchrony of the visual
feedback, while the correlation was not signiﬁcant considering the
heartbeat awareness task. The present study addresses this issue
for the ﬁrst time during the FBI. On the one hand, our results
recorded in neurologically unimpaired participants are in line
with those reported by Suzuki and collaborators: a tendency to-
wards a signiﬁcant positive correlation was found between self-identiﬁcation and the questionnaire's item investigating the feel-
ing that the ﬂashing visual stimulus corresponded to participants’
own heartbeat (Q9), while no signiﬁcant correlation between the
measures of heartbeat awareness and illusion was recorded. On
the other hand, the data of the present patient demonstrate that
BSC and the heartbeat detection task are differently linked to the
right insula. Collectively, these data emphasize the relevance of
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals for BSC and point to the
role of the insula as an important structure for heartbeat aware-
ness (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007) and BSC as
mediated through interoceptive–exteroceptive conﬂicts. More-
over, even if BSC and heartbeat awareness are both linked to the
activity of the insular cortex, interoceptive and exteroceptive in-
formation can be integrated and may elicit an alteration of BSC
evenwith a reduced level of interoceptive awareness (as measured
by the Schandry detection task).
Illusory reduplication of the body or body parts are complex
clinical manifestations that have previously been described in the
literature. The most common manifestations are autoscopic phe-
nomena, which are illusory own body perceptions including out-
of-body experience, autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy
(Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Brugger, 2002; Devinsky et al., 1989). The
most relevant of these phenomena for the present observation are
neurological patients affected by heautoscopy: these patients re-
port seeing a double of themselves in the extrapersonal space,
associated with strong self-identiﬁcation, and with frequent re-
ports of bodily reduplication and of being at two places at the
same time (bi-location: Brugger et al., 2006; Brugger, 2002; Hey-
drich and Blanke, 2013). We argue that the altered state of BSC
characterized by changes in self-identiﬁcation, self-location, as
well as bi-location and bodily duplication in the present patient
after cardio-visual stimulation shares many aspects with heauto-
scopy, suggesting that we may have induced a mild form of
heautoscopy in the present patient through cardio-visual exposure
with a virtual body. Feelings of body duplication and bi-location
have also been reported in psychiatric (e.g., schizophrenia, de-
pression, anxiety, dissociative disorders) and neurological (epi-
lepsy, stroke, infection, migraine, neoplasia) diseases (Brugger
et al., 1997; Bünning and Blanke, 2005; Dening and Berrios, 1994;
Devinsky et al., 1989; Grüsser and Landis, 1991; Mohr and Blanke,
2005), and among them heautoscopy is frequently associated with
emotional afﬁnity towards the seen illusory body and deperso-
nalization, as well as abnormal visceroceptive sensations (Brugger
et al., 1997; Heydrich and Blanke, 2013). The present patient and
heautoscopy patients also share insular damage, as brain damage
in patients with heautoscopy was previously linked to the insula
(Heydrich and Blanke, 2013). It has been argued that heautoscopy
is caused by defective integration of visuo-somatosensory signals
with emotional-interoceptive cues due to damage of the insular
cortex (for a more detailed discussion see Heydrich and Blanke,
2013), further supported by evidence linking the insular cortex to
emotional-social processing. Thus, previous studies showed that
insular activity can be related to pain perception and observation
of pain in other people (Singer et al., 2004), to see other people
tasting pleasant and unpleasant drinks (Jabbi et al., 2007; see
Singer et al., 2009 for a review), to self-other discrimination in face
recognition (Kircher et al., 2000), in awareness of own actions
(Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008; Farrer and Frith, 2002) and also in
complex social interactions (Ebisch et al., 2011; Koban et al., 2013).
More work is necessary to understand the differences that may
exist between the involvement of right and left insula in inter-
oception, interoceptive awareness, and their impact on BSC based
on cardio-visual and visuo-tactile stimulations. Thus, the present
patient suffered from right insular damage, whereas patients with
heautoscopy were found to suffer from primarily left insular da-
mage (Heydrich and Blanke, 2013).
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the inner organs and that has been previously linked to heauto-
scopy (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Brugger et al.,
1997) may be of relevance for the present patient. Inner heauto-
scopy is a rare illusory own body perception (Lhermitte, 1951;
Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Sollier, 1903; see also Dening and
Berrios, 1994; Hécaen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Shilder, 1935) where
patients claim to see an inner organ or part of an inner organ
(heart, lungs, liver) in the exterapersonal space (for recent review
see Blanke et al., 2008). Modern accounts of inner heautoscopy are
rare (Carlson, 1977; Magrí and Mocchetti, 1967; Peto, 1969) and
most cases have been described over hundred years ago (Bain,
1903; Comar, 1901; Sollier, 1903). With respect to the present
patient, it is noteworthy that the heart seems to be the most
prominent organ. Thus, Comar (1901; case #1) described a 18-
year-old female patient who reported seeing her heart and Brug-
ger et al. (1997) described a patient who saw the interior of his
torso including heart and blood vessels. Sollier (1903) also de-
scribed a patient claiming to see her heart, lungs, and other or-
gans. Given the association of an alteration of heartbeat awareness
and BSC (including the sensation of having two hearts) in the
present patient with insular damage when exposed to cardio-vi-
sual stimulation, it may be suggested that inner heautoscopy may
be a visualized (and thus externalized) percept based on abnor-
mally integrated interoceptive and exteroceptive signals caused by
insular damage. However, as reports about this condition are ex-
tremely rare and as there is currently no report in the literature
about inner heautoscopy after acquired brain damage, caution is
warranted and experimental data in such patients are needed.
Finally, we note that the growth of the tumour had a different
impact on BSC and heartbeat awareness. Based on our results, the
presence of the tumour, before its resection, mainly affected BSC,
with cardio-visual stimulation triggering illusory self-identiﬁca-
tion (in a not synchrony-speciﬁc fashion), body-duplication and
bi-location. Thus, BSC was already altered in the pre-surgical
phase. Related alteration of BSC have been reported in previous
studies, such as heautoscopy and body reduplication, in which
these manifestations were observed during unilateral brain tu-
mour inﬁltration (Brugger et al., 2006) or in regions with unilateral
epileptic seizures and thus without focal damage or brain tissue
removal (Heydrich and Blanke, 2013). Based on these data, we
argue that insular dysfunction without complete insular damage is
sufﬁcient to alter multisensory integration between cardiac and
visual signals that are of relevance for BSC, emotional processing
and self-other discrimination. These processes most likely require
a functional network of brain regions beyond the insula: by con-
sequence, in the presence of a pathology affecting the insula (a key
brain area for the function of interest), ad hoc stimulation (in-
cluding cardio-visual behavioural stimulations, as in our case, or
abnormal excessive neuronal activity in the brain, as during epi-
leptic seizure) may elicit the altered BSC phenomena (related to
heautoscopy) that we describe. We also note that we have de-
tected small differences in BSC alterations evoked before and after
the surgery: changes in self-location and feeling of bi-location
were equally induced in the pre- and post-surgery evaluations;
however, after tumour removal the illusory effects on BSC became
synchrony-dependent for self-identiﬁcation and did not involve
body reduplication (as shown by the statistical comparison be-
tween patient and controls). We note, however, that these ﬁndings
still remain selective as control items were similarly rated before
and after the surgery. Self-location (i.e., the experience of where I
am in space) and self-identiﬁcation (i.e., the experience of owning
a body) refer to two different, even if closely linked, aspects of BSC;
moreover, it has been experimentally demonstrated that the ma-
nipulation of bodily signals may alter selectively one or more of
these characteristics (see Blanke, 2012 for a review). Byconsequence, two types of brain impairment (i.e., dysfunctional
brain caused by tumour inﬁltration versus complete structural
brain damage by surgical resection) may affect in a slightly dif-
ferent way these two components of BSC. In particular, with re-
spect to self-identiﬁcation, the presence of a strong, synchrony-
independent effect before surgery could be caused by the re-
cruitment of dysfunctional tissue within the right insular region
for cardio-visual processing, with an undiscriminating illusory
outcome for synchronous and asynchronous signals. An alter-
native may be that these dissimilarities are caused by differences
in anti-epileptic medication, with less efﬁcient treatment in the
early pre-surgery evaluation (i.e., 5 days after anti-epileptic
treatment was started).
Differing from BSC, heartbeat awareness was not affected by
tumour growth, compared to age-matched controls. We argue that
this is related to the presence of functional vicarious brain regions
beyond the right insula, compensating for interoceptive aware-
ness. Thus, previous studies have demonstrated that in patients
with low grade gliomas some structures may still remain func-
tional within brain regions inﬁltrated by a tumour; moreover, it
has been shown that peri-lesional areas can be recruited and can
compensate for impaired functions during phases of progressive
tumour growth (Duffau et al., 2003; Schiffbauer et al., 2001), dif-
fering from the effects of acute brain damage due to stroke or
neurosurgical resection. Accordingly, we argue that the present
post-operative reduction of heartbeat awareness was detected
because the surgical removal of the brain tumour included also
those structures that were functional within the tumour and the
surrounding tissue. We propose that this may explain why
heartbeat awareness in our patient was still preserved with re-
spect to controls before the surgery and affected after the tumour
removal. However, we note that, although after tumour resection
the heartbeat awareness level of the patient was signiﬁcantly
decreased with respect to the pre-surgery level, it was still not
signiﬁcantly different from the average heartbeat awareness of the
neurologically unimpaired participants (i.e., it was comparable
with the low-level sub-group): again, this could be accounted for
by the presence of functional regions beyond the area of resection
(Duffau, 2014) not damaged or removed by the surgery and, fur-
thermore, argue for the existence of other brain regions playing an
important role in interoceptive awareness (in addition to the right
insula, such as bilateral somatosensory cortical networks) (Couto
et al., 2014; Khalsa et al., 2009).
In conclusion, the present case report corroborates the key role
of the insula in interoceptive-cardiac processing, heartbeat
awareness, and presents the ﬁrst evidence of its involvement in
mediating cardio-visual effects that have been shown to impact
BSC. Moreover, in the case of insular damage this BSC alteration
may be associated with a loss of the experienced unity of the self,
perceived as bi-location and body reduplication.Acknowledgements
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